The Fleet Air Arm and the Met Branch

Although the meteorological and oceanographic assets of the RN no longer come under the umbrella of the FAA, it is still necessary to maintain a close working relationship between the two, ensuring the efficient operation of naval aircraft and the safety of those involved in flying and supporting that operation. The civilian met service has always been quick to point out that they are able to supply a more than adequate weather service to the Fleet both ashore and afloat. Once naval aircraft were introduced just prior to World War One it became apparent that there was a very real need for naval meteorologists and they have survived in one guise or another ever since. It is, at this time crucial that we should support the Fleet Air Arm and its ever decreasing assets as it fights for its own survival.

As a team we would like to make members aware that the very existence of the FAA and the jobs of all those personnel who work in the air arm are very much in danger. The situation is very far from a done deal, with the government currently questioning its own Strategic Defence Review (SDSR) and how they reached the decisions publicised to date. If you agree that the FAA is a cause worth fighting for; there is still the time and opportunity for you to make a difference.

Below and to the right you will find links to a number of web sites that have sprung up in defence of the FAA. As well as providing compelling reasons why the FAA should remain, you will also find a host of interesting articles giving more information about a service we all worked in, than probably, we knew at the time. You will also find out what you can do to help.

Cloud Observers, both the association and the web site are not political. The opinions expressed here are the personal ones of the Chair backed by the Team. We feel that dedicating one page of the site to the Fleet Air Arm is reasonable in these, what could be devastating circumstances.

Fleet Air Arm Downloads
Title (Download Total)	File Type
100 Royal Naval Air Stations (627)	pdf document
100 Royal Naval Air Stations (3074)	powerpoint
FAA Centenary News Issue 1 (672)	pdf document
FAA Centenary News Issue 2 (637)	pdf document
FAA Centenary News Issue 3 (506)	pdf document
FAA Centenary News Issue 4 (518)	pdf document
FAA Centenary News Issue 5 (624)	pdf document
FAA Centenary News Issue 5 insert (383)	pdf document
Carrier Waves Jan 2010 (334)	pdf document
FNHT Newsletter November 2011 (46)	pdf document
QE Class Supply Chain (223)	pdf document

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Contents

Executive Summary. 2

Introduction. 3

Background. 3

Do CDM/DE&S have an Agenda?. 3

What is the thrust of the advice now being offered to the Secretary of State by CDM/DE&S?. 4

Are CDM/DE&S advices properly researched and ‘fair and balanced’?. 4

Moving F-35 Goal Posts – Vested Interest and Short Term Expediency. 5

2002 – Vested Interest. 5

2010 – Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). 6

2012 – Balancing the Books. 6

The Implications of Opting for the STOVL version of the F-35(B) instead of the conventional carrier version, the F-35C. 7

The Capability of the F-35B Aircraft Compared with the F-35C. 7

Less Space for the Carriage of Internal Fuel. 7

A Smaller Weapons Bay. 8

The significantly higher risk associated with the STOVL F-35B. 8

The inability to generate Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel (SQEP) for ship’s staff. 8

The increased cost of the STOVL aircraft. 9

A Further Implication. 10

A Different Air to Air Refuelling Configuration. 10

Discussion. 10

Recommendations. 11

Executive Summary.

 

i.          This paper examines the suggestion that the UK should now revert to the Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant of the F-35 Lightning II fighter aircraft for operations from the new Queen Elizabeth class carriers.

 

ii.         It addresses whether such a change in course (which is understood to be based entirely upon short-term financial expediency) is compatible with the Government’s/Secretary of State’s recent statement that “We are committed to purchasing the carrier-variant [of JSF/F-35] and the regeneration of our carrier strike force is at the heart of our defence strategy.”

 

iii.        In doing so it highlights the serious harm that could be inflicted by such a change in course on the carrier strike programme both in the short-term and long-term; thereby limiting Britain’s future capability to project power and protect our trade routes and overseas interests.

 

iv.        It recommends that the Secretary of State should now consider alternative short-term savings from within other projects; within which cuts would be less painful and less injurious to Britain’s future strategic capability.  After all, we wouldn’t wish for short-term expediency to adversely affect the 50 year capability that is represented by our new carriers.

 

 

 

Introduction.

 

1.         It is understood that the Government wishes to make a political statement before Easter to the effect that they have eliminated the “black hole” in defence spending.

 

2.         It is also understood that their advisers are governing their recommendations on the strength of short-term financial expediency rather than strategic value/need.  They appear to have forgotten that the short-term expediency behind SDSR 2010 recommendations led to misguided decisions that have now been recognised as such and regretted.

 

3.         It is for consideration that the recommendations now being put forward to the Secretary of State emanate from an ‘agenda’ that does not balance the efficacy and strategic value of the different projects that should be under scrutiny in a fair and balanced manner.

 

4.         This paper addresses these issues and underlines the severe consequences that would result from further misguided decisions.

 

Background.

 

5.         The Secretary of State for Defence, the Right Honourable Philip Hammond MP wishes to convey to the Nation before Easter that he has balanced the books concerning the infamous “black hole” in defence spending. He receives direct advice on this from the Chief of Defence Materiel  (CDM) and the Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) department and DCDS CAP AVM Hillier.

 

Do CDM/DE&S have an Agenda?

 

6.         It would appear that CDM/DE&S do have ‘an agenda’ because the suggestions now being put forward by their offices for eliminating the “black hole” are understood to pay no regard whatsoever to Mr Hammond’s recent statement during his visit to the USA that, “We are committed to purchasing the carrier-variant [of JSF/F-35] and the regeneration of our carrier strike force is at the heart of our defence strategy.[1]”

 

 

 

 

 

What is the thrust of the advice now being offered to the Secretary of State by CDM/DE&S?

 

7.         It is understood that CDM/DE&S and DCDS CAP AVM Hillier are concentrating their cost saving measures on the ‘manipulation’ of the Carrier Strike Project, the results of which would have very severe consequences for that Project.  They are suggesting that in order to save cost in the short term and to allow Mr Hammond to claim that he has ‘balanced the books’:

a)      The conversion of the carriers during build to take the Electro-magnetic Launch System (EMALS) catapult and Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) should be delayed or, significantly,

b)      The MoD should now opt for the STOVL version of the F-35(B) instead of the conventional carrier version, the F-35C: thus negating the need for EMALS and AAG.  (It is understood that EMALS is already paid for*.)

 

8.         The short-term savings resulting from this* are understood to be postulated at approximately £1.7 billion. However, CDM/DE&S and DCDS CAP AVM Hillier appear to have made no effort whatsoever to put this in context with:

a)      The very high risk and increasing cost of the F-35B STOVL aircraft.

b)      The severe operational limitations/implications that would accrue from such a choice (see paragraphs 18 to 40, below).

c)      The ever increasing cost of and the savings that could be achieved from the Typhoon project – which according to the National Audit Office has already consumed £20.2 billion and which, according to the Public Accounts Committee[2], is destined to swallow a further £37 billion over the next 20 years.

d)      The RAF DPOC requirement which during SDSR 10 saw a requirement of a mixed fleet of F-35 A and B.  F-35 A while meeting DPOC requirements is not compatible with our new fleet of AAR tankers whereas F-35C meets both.

 

The Typhoon project would appear to be one logical and responsible area for reducing cost in the short-term and would not adversely affect ‘the heart of our defence strategy’.

 

Are CDM/DE&S advices properly researched and ‘fair and balanced’?

 

9.         Before addressing Mr Hammond’s statement at paragraph 6 above in more detail in relation to the advice now being put forward by CDM/DE&S and DCDS CAP AVM Hillier, it is most strongly suggested that the latter should have conducted a major and comparative investigation into all major projects both on-going and envisaged. This investigation should have asked the following questions:

 

a)      What are all the major Defence Projects that are contributing to this “black hole”?

b)      What is the forecast expenditure on each Project in the short term and in the long-term?

c)      What is the operational justification for each Project within the context of stated strategic policy and of the perceived threats to our National Defence and Security Interests?

d)      In the light of c), above, can the cost of individual Projects be justified when compared with other Projects that are designed to counter similar or more serious threats?

e)      If not, why are scarce defence funds being used to support such Projects?

 

10.       Clearly, CDM/DE&S and DCDS CAP AVM Hillier have failed to address these questions properly and their failure to conduct such an investigation in a fair and balanced manner must be considered an abrogation of responsibility – in terms of ‘financial oversight’ as well as ‘the need for our Armed Forces to be properly configured to meet the perceived threat’.

 

11.       The recent flawed advice given to ministers by DE&S concerning the comparative costs of the F-18 Super Hornet and the F-35 Lightning II (JSF) is a further indication of an “agenda”. According to official Department of Defence budgetary figures for 2012[3], the Super Hornet is approximately half the price of the F-35 and according to the U.S. Navy has much lower in-service costs.  DE&S ignored these official US figures and are reported to have presented the two aircraft as being the same price.

 

Moving F-35 Goal Posts – Vested Interest and Short Term Expediency.

 

2002 – Vested Interest.

 

12.       The initial choice of variant of the F-35 was driven by the strong voice of MoD/RAF who insisted that the STOVL F-35B version should be selected – countering the advice of the then Chief Scientific Officer to select the Carrier variant .  The RAF view was contrary to the wishes of the Royal Navy but the latter were overruled in Committee. The reason behind the RAF choice had nothing whatsoever to do with operations from an aircraft carrier. It was because they, the RAF, had a private agenda which was referred to as the Deep Penetration Offensive Craft (DPOC).

 

13.       DPOC was envisaged as a long-range, land based bomber and would have provided the RAF with a deep strike capability that could not be achieved by either Tornado the Eurofighter Typhoon.

 

14.       Of the three F-35 variants, the STOVL ‘B’ version had the shortest strike range and the RAF could see therefore that if the land-based ‘A’ version or the carrier-based ‘C’ version was chosen, the deep strike capability of either aircraft would mitigate against any thought of approving the DPOC project.

 

2010 – Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR).

 

15.       During deliberations on SDSR 2010, the RAF was clearly told by the Treasury that DPOC was a complete non-starter. As a result the RAF agreed that the STOVL ‘B’ variant had the shortest range and a very limited internal weapons payload (weapon size is limited to 1000 lb bombs – it would not even be able to deploy the 2000 lb Paveway deep penetration bomb as used later in the Libya confrontation)[4].

 

16.       The RAF then moved the goalposts from their 2002 position and agreed that the F-35C option should be the variant of choice. It was carrier capable and had the greatest strike range and best overall weapons capability.

 

2012 – Balancing the Books.

 

17.       It would appear that CDM/DE&S and DCDS CAP AVM Hillier now wish to move the goalposts again back to the F-35B STOVL aircraft for short-term expediency:

a)      Without paying due regard to the strategic operational implications of doing so and

b)      Without considering adjustments in other projects, such as Typhoon, that could more easily help balance the books in the short term without adversely affecting the strategic imperative of carrier strike.

This would ‘open the door’ for more overtures by the RAF concerning their postulated need for a Deep Penetration Offensive Craft.  This raises the question as to whether there is any behind the scenes ‘link’ between CDM/DE&S and RAF aspirations – and whether this is colouring the advice now being given by the former to the Secretary of State.

 

 

 

The Implications of Opting for the STOVL version of the F-35(B) instead of the conventional carrier version, the F-35C.

 

18.       The implications of reverting to the F-35B are, in the main, prejudicial to the timely introduction and capability of carrier strike.  The principal implications are discussed below under the headings:

a)      The capability of the F-35B aircraft compared with the F-35C.

b)      The significantly higher risk associated with the STOVL F-35B.

c)      The inability to generate Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel (SQEP) for ship’s staff.

d)      The increased cost of the STOVL aircraft.

 

The Capability of the F-35B Aircraft Compared with the F-35C.

 

19.       The STOVL aircraft has the capability of vertical flight and horizontal flight. The inclusion of the former has directly resulted in:

a)      Less space for the carriage of internal fuel,

b)      A smaller weapons bay.

 

Less Space for the Carriage of Internal Fuel.

 

20.       Part of the attraction of the F-35 are its qualities of stealth. This stealth can only properly be maintained in flight through the internal (rather than external) carriage of fuel and weapons. The components of the engine that provides for vertical lift have taken up the space that would otherwise be devoted to the carriage of internal fuel. This has led to an expected unrefuelled combat radius[5] of:

a)      F-35C – 760 nautical miles.

b)      F-35B – 420 nautical miles.

c)      F-35A – 600 nautical miles.

 

21.       The ‘C’ combat radius is therefore 80% greater than the ‘B’.  This is extremely significant in operational capability terms – allowing for deeper strike missions and enabling the aircraft carrier to stand further offshore and further away from land-based threat weapons systems.

 

 

A Smaller Weapons Bay.

 

22.       It is understood that the dimensions of the F-35B internal weapons bay will not allow it to carry weapons larger than the 1000 lb. bomb. This is a very severe limitation in operational capability and in the ‘hitting power’ of carrier strike.

 

23.       Development programmes that are looking at the reduction in size of air to surface ordnance whilst maintaining the same “killing power” are unlikely to be of benefit to the F-35B until well beyond the year 2025.

The significantly higher risk associated with the STOVL F-35B.

 

24.       Each of these aircraft variants continue to suffer from multiple development problems (whether technological/software oriented, engineering or structural). Because of its complex STOVL configuration, the F-35B is subject to many more of these problems some of which have no bearing upon the ‘A’ or the ‘C’ – for example, in the power train that provides vertical thrust.

 

25.       These problems continue to cause extensive delays in the development and production program as a whole and, indeed, have already cast doubt upon the efficacy of the F-35B program.  Currently, there is no end in sight to these problems and a definitive time for the expected in-service date of fully functional aircraft cannot yet be established. It is more than likely that, if chosen, the F-35B may not be available for UK service until well beyond 2020.

 

26.       There is an even greater risk that if the development problems continue with the STOVL aircraft, fiscal constraint within the US Department of Defence budget could lead to the F-35B project being cancelled in its entirety. The recent suspension of funding for the F-35B by the U.S. Defense Secretary (which has presently been lifted pending more scrutiny) is a clear demonstration that such cancellation is a possibility.

 

27.       Should Britain opt for the F-35B now as a short-term financial expedient and configure our new carriers accordingly, there is a significant risk that we would be left high and dry with no fighter aircraft to operate from our new ships – and no fall-back position.

 

The inability to generate Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel (SQEP) for ship’s staff.

 

28.       The decision to opt for the F-35C carrier variant gave our future air group full commonality with the U.S. Navy. The planned carrier air group establishment for the latter includes both F-35C and the F-18 Super Hornet. We now have naval aviators flying with the U.S. Navy in the F-18 Super Hornet and we also have air engineers and maintenance ratings on exchange: all of them developing or increasing their expertise in conventional flat deck carrier operations. It is this expertise that will be extremely important for the effective operation of both the Queen Elizabeth class carrier itself and its air group.

 

29.       This vital exchange/assistance program will be able to continue as long as Britain is opting for the F-35C variant and will provide us with Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel for squadron and ship staff.

 

30.       Should we now switch to the STOVL version of the aircraft, it is probable that the U.S. Navy would terminate the exchange/assistance program; there no longer being adequate common ground or the expectation of future interoperability. This would be catastrophic for our SQEP training program.

 

31.       It is understood that the United States Marine Corps would offer flying and engineering billets within their F-35B squadrons but they do not have the facilities or scope to provide the comprehensive SQEP carrier training that is available from the U.S. Navy. Indeed, unlike the F-18 Super Hornet which our aviators are flying now, no billets with the US Marine Corps STOVL squadrons are likely to be available much before 2020. With our first carrier entering service in 2015, that would be of no use at all to our SQEP training needs.

 

32.       Without trained carrier aviation staff, the Queen Elizabeth class carrier would be inoperable as an effective weapons platform.

 

 

The increased cost of the STOVL aircraft.

 

35.       Irrespective of which option is chosen, the cost of any of the variants will far exceed that anticipated at the beginning of this project (US$60 million per unit).  Official Department of Defence budgetary figures for 2012 give an off-the-shelf cost of approximately US$190 million and this figure is likely to increase as:

a)      Development problems persist.

b)      All prospective customers cut the size of their orders for the aircraft (including in the United States Armed Forces).

As development costs increase and orders reduce, it is inevitable that the unit cost of the production aircraft will rise accordingly.

 

36.       Of the three variants, it is the STOVL version that suffers from most of the development problems and its cost is therefore expected to rise significantly above that of the F-35C.

 

A Further Implication.

 

37.       Should the government agree to follow the misguided recommendation from CDM/DE&S and DCDS CAP AVM Hillier that the naval carrier air group should be established with the F-35B STOVL variant, it is understood that the RAF would wish to opt for a procurement of F-35A aircraft (the land-based non-carrier capable aircraft). Should this be the case, it would represent another example of poor planning within the MoD because the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft (FSTA) is not compatible with the F-35A.

 

A Different Air to Air Refuelling Configuration.

 

38.       There are two different types of air to air refuelling configuration available to modern military aircraft:

a)      The tanker aircraft transfers fuel to the receiving aircraft via a boom that is “flown” into a receptacle behind the cockpit of the receiving aircraft.

b)      The tanker aircraft transfers fuel to the receiving aircraft via a drogue and the receiving aircraft flies its refuelling probe into the drogue basket.

 

39.       All naval aircraft (including the F-35C and the F-18) are compatible with drogue air to air refuelling and are therefore compatible with and can receive fuel from the FSTA.

 

40.       The F-35A is configured for “boom” refuelling and is therefore incompatible with the drogue-configured FSTA.

 

Discussion.

 

41.       It appears to be the case that:

a)      CDM/DE&S and DCDS CAP AVM Hillier are recommending to the Secretary of State that the JSF option for our new carriers should revert to the F-35B STOVL variant and that

b)      This would pre-empt the need for EMALS and AAG and make available short-term savings to help balance the defence budget.

 

42.       It is also clear that:

a)      CDM/DE&S have not paid proper regard to the severe implications of such a way ahead for the capability and availability of our new carriers’ air groups.

b)      They have not addressed the possibility of achieving the same savings from other major projects such as Typhoon – the effect of which on those projects would be far less catastrophic and injurious to our strategic air power interests.

 

Recommendations.

 

43.       In the light of the severe consequences to our strategic air power interests and to the carrier strike program in particular, it is recommended that the Secretary of State instructs CDM/DE&S and DCDS CAP AVM Hillier to find savings from other more appropriate and less vital projects for what can only be seen as ‘a short term expedient’ that could otherwise have ‘extreme long-term consequences’.

 

44.       It is further recommended that the Secretary of State considers:

a)      Imposing an immediate moratorium upon the UK F-35 program until the timeline, the true cost and true in-service capability of the aircraft is determined.

b)      Proceeding with the interim procurement of a proven combat aircraft (F-18 Super Hornet) that enjoys full commonality with and interoperability with the US Navy, that is planned to remain in US naval service until at least 2035 and that is less than half the price of any F-35 variant.

 

45.       Such measures would:

a)      Prevent further possibly nugatory investment in the very high risk and high cost F-35 program,

b)      Provide for the timely introduction of an extremely capable 4.5 generation multirole combat aircraft into naval service and, significantly at the same time,

c)      Reduce the worrying gap in Britain’s carrier capability and our associated ability to project power in protection of our national and overseas interests.

 

46.       Churchill’s wise words remain pertinent:

 

“Nothing, nothing in the world, nothing that you may think of or dream of, or anyone else may tell you: no argument, however seductive, must lead you to abandon that Naval supremacy on which the life of our country depends”.

 

“Whereas any European power has to support a vast army first of all, we in this fortunate, happy island, relieved by our insular position of a double burden, may turn our undivided efforts and attention to the Fleet.  Why should we sacrifice a game in which we are sure to win to play a game in which we are bound to lose?”

The Achilles Heel of the Current Defence Reforms.

Executive Summary.

 

i.          This paper calls into question the manner in which UK Governments have provided oversight and direction to defence spending.

 

ii.         It reveals a significant failure on the part of the Government to compare

 

a)     The efficacy and

b)     The cost and operational utility of major defence projects.

 

Introduction.

 

1.         We are now undergoing major reforms of how the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Services conduct their business. The main driver here is ‘cost-effectiveness’ but the Prime Minister and his team have also referred to the need for ‘operational effectiveness’ being maintained without any suggestions as to how this may be achieved.

 

2.         That is a serious omission but the facts and evolution of the current defence debate do tend to reveal it.

 

3.         This short paper highlights a major deficiency in the manner in which our government conducts its defence business.

 

A Lack of Broad Responsible Oversight.

 

4.         With the massive “black hole” in the defence budget over the next few years (as referred to by our Prime Minister during deliberations on SDSR 2010) one could have expected a major and comparative investigation by the Treasury, The National Audit Office (NAO), the Committee for Public Accounts (PAC) and the House of Commons Defence Select Committee on Procurement (HCDC) into all major projects – both on-going and envisaged.  It would indeed have been prudent for these august bodies to ask the questions:

 

a)     What are all the major Defence Projects that are contributing to this “black hole”?

b)     What is the forecast cost of each Project over the next 15 years?

c)      What is the operational justification for each Project within the context of stated strategic policy and of the perceived threats to our National Defence and Security Interests?

d)     In the light of 4.c), above, can the cost of individual Projects be justified when compared with other Projects that are designed to counter similar threats?

e)     If not, why are scarce defence funds being used to support such Projects?

 

5.         Failure to conduct such an investigation by the Government would be an abrogation of responsibility – in terms of ‘financial oversight’ as well as ‘the need for our Armed Forces to be properly configured to meet the perceived threat’.

 

Projection of Power and Deterrence of Those That Would Harm Us.

 

6.         Following his recent meetings with the United States Secretary for Defence, our Secretary of State, the Right Honourable Philip Hammond MP gave the following statement[1]:

 

“We are committed to purchasing the carrier-variant [of JSF/F-35] and the regeneration of our carrier strike force is at the heart of our defence strategy.”

 

7.         This follows the somewhat contradictory statement by the Permanent Under-Secretary as reported in the Committee of Public Accounts Report^[2], “Providing the U.K.’s Carrier Strike Capability”.

 

Ursula Brennan: “This is the point I was making earlier that, as it happens, in recent years, we have not been using the carrier. When this was very first discussed in the 1990s, we had been using the carrier. We have been through quite a long period when it has not been essential to the way we do business, because we have been able to rely on access, basing and overflight agreements with other countries.”[3]

 

She appeared to have little understanding of the strategic policy stated by Philip Hammond MP at paragraph 6, above or of the deterrence value of aircraft carriers.  Her remark was made during discussions concerning the value for money of the Carrier Strike Project.

 

8.         What was missing from these PAC discussions were the questions raised at paragraph 4, above. Of particular note was the lack of any reference to other major projects concerned with the projection of power overseas.

 

9.         Without any meter of comparison, there can be no objective decision on whether value for money is achieved by the carrier project.  It is only through comparison with other major defence projects that its worth can be assessed.  Figure 1, below, does make such a comparison – looking at estimated costs over the next 15 years.  Figure 3, below goes on to look at the capabilities achieved by these projects.

 

 

Figure 1. Projected Cost – Three Major Projects.

 

(Carrier Project costs include the ‘planned’ Air Group including EW and tanker variants of the F18. Typhoon Project costs are taken directly from the report on Typhoon by the Committee for Public Accounts.  Air Refuelling Tanker Project costs are estimated government figures.)

10.       The Tanker Project must be seen as a necessary facilitator for the movement of land-based air (e.g. Typhoon) to overseas locations where British offensive air power and deterrence is required if no Carrier Battle Group capability is available.  It is not therefore unreasonable to link these two projects and compare them with the projected cost of the Carrier Project: see Figure 2, below.  No account is taken of the costs of accommodation, storage, airfield rental or logistic supplies, all of which are additional costs to land-based air power projection.

 

 

Figure 2. Projected Cost – Carrier v Land-Based Air.

 

 

11.       In order to be totally objective it would have been entirely apposite for Mrs Brennan to have iterated the operational and political advantages of Carrier Air Power over Land-Based Air – its extraordinary flexibility, its multimission capability in peace and war (See Figure 3, below)  and its successful power projection and deterrence record over the last 70 years. Land-based air power is unable to come near to matching this versatility and track record – hence the strategic policy decision that has been made.

 

Figure 3.  Air Power Capabilities and Roles – East of Suez.

 

Air Power Capabilities and Roles – East of Suez
	Carrier Borne	Typhoon
Leaves undesirable political footprint	No	Yes
Requires pre-positioning of support	No	Yes
Requires Basing & Over-Flight Rights	No	Yes
Aid to Civil Power	√	No
Disaster Relief	√	No
Evacuation of British Nationals	√	No
On site powerful Visible Deterrence	√	Very Limited
Task Force Air Defence & Air Support
Suppression of enemy air defences	√	No*
Air Space Denial	√	Partial
Rapid Offensive Air Support	√	Very Limited
Airborne Early Warning (AEW)	√	No**
Defence Against Missile & Aircraft Attack	√	Very Limited
Over the Horizon Reconnaissance	√	Very Limited
Responsive Over the Horizon Strike	√	No
Responsive Intruder Identification	√	No
Command & Control	√	No**
Combat Search & Rescue	√	No
Full Combat Medical Service	√	No
Full Amphibious Operation Support	√	No
* UK Land-based Air has no equivalent of the US Navy F-18 Growler that eliminated Gadhafi’s air defence infrastructure in Libya.
** AWACS/AEW comes at extra cost (as does Sentinel and Logistic support).

 

12.       Had the appropriate comparison between projects been made (on financial and as well as operational capability grounds), it would have been very clear that the Carrier Strike Project (costing less than a quarter of the combined Typhoon and Tanker Project) represents extremely good value for money and fully justifies Government Strategic Policy as stated by our Secretary of State at paragraph 6, above.

 

13.       At the same time and entirely logically in the context of current fiscal constraint, it would have brought into question the wisdom of continued excessive investment in Typhoon and supporting land-based air resources[4].

 

More Food for Thought.

 

14.       Looking to the immediate future, the Joint Strike Fighter[5] (JSF) project referred to by our Secretary of State would be another case in point. In very brief terms the F-35 solution may prove to be:

 

a)     Extremely high risk[6] – probably more so than any other aircraft project in the history of aviation,

b)     Very high cost (which continues to increase unabated[7]) and

c)      Unlikely to be able to provide our strike carriers with the full multi-role capability that the latter require for safe and effective operations[8].

 

15.       The F-18 Super Hornet family of aircraft which continues to be the first choice for the United States Navy for multi-role Air Defence, Defence Suppression and Offensive Air Support up to at least 2035 would seem to present  a perfectly capable and relatively low-cost alternative available to satisfy our needs. Clearly achieving such an economical and interoperable solution would need to be set against the industrial implications in the UK but this alternative should not have been ignored by such a key body as the PAC.

 

Summary.

 

16.       Viewing major projects in isolation would appear to be a less than responsible Government practice that is counter-productive in terms of

 

a)     Defence expenditure,

b)     Operational capability against perceived threats,

c)      Political flexibility and

d)     Fiscal constraint.

 

The ‘fair and balanced’ comparison given above between Carrier Strike and the Typhoon/Tanker Projects would appear to demonstrate this well.

 

17.       A major reduction in the defence budget “black hole” could be realised by reining in continued expenditure on the Typhoon and associated projects.  (From a military standpoint, the Typhoons currently in service are more than capable of providing air defence of the UK airspace against which there is no perceived threat until 2020. This role can then be readily fulfilled by the new carrier air groups – whether embarked or disembarked – when they enter service.  Such a realignment of defence expenditure could save the taxpayer approximately £25 billion[9].)

 

Conclusions.

 

18.       When reviewing the efficacy and worth of a major defence project it is considered that the Government should ensure:

 

a)     This is not done in isolation;

b)     Realistic comparative studies with other major defence projects that address similar elements of the perceived threat are conducted;

c)      All aspects of a project (in addition to operational factors) are taken into account.

 

19.       In terms of Britain’s ability to project power and influence, it is considered appropriate/essential that responsible government agencies now conduct an up-to-date and realistic[10] risk, cost, operational and diplomatic capability comparison between the Carrier Strike Project and the Typhoon/New Tanker Project.  In doing so, respected sources of Royal Navy air warfare/carrier expertise should be relied upon for practical carrier operational advice while specifically shore-based air advice should continue to be made by RAF officers – with both sets of advisors subject to the other’s scrutiny.

Response to Mail On Sunday article 3rd July 2011

Sir,
Your article, “RAF deploy extra warplanes over Libya as rough seas hit French aircraft carrier” by Mail On Sunday Reporter, 3rd July 2011, cannot by any strength of the imagination be considered fair and balanced.
Naval fighters from the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier have carried out 2000 of the 5000 strike sorties so far conducted over Libya.  Our land-based Tornado and the Typhoon aircraft have managed to contribute no more than 500 sorties – at disproportionately high cost.
Yes, severe weather conditions at sea can sometimes limit flying opportunities.  But that is more frequently the case with land-based air than sea-based air – as was experienced during the Bosnian crisis when carrier borne Sea Harrier aircraft often conducted the ground attack missions that the Tornado in southern Italy could not fulfil because of weather.
In the interest of being fair and balanced, you might wish to publish this letter and the photograph below showing the appalling conditions in which carrier borne aircraft operated during the Falklands war. My 801 Naval Air Squadron of eight aircraft flew 600 missions in six weeks in the most challenging weather conditions – and never missed a single tasked mission.

Yours most sincerely,
Nigel D MacCartan-Ward DSC AFC
Commander Royal Navy (ret’d)

The Navy Campaign

The Navy Campaign was established in the wake of the SDSR, as the consequences of political decisions became clear. As the naval community responded to the cuts, it became apparent that a focal point was needed in order to direct some of this energy. The role of the Navy Campaign is to make sure information gets to where it needs to be, briefing MPs, members of the press and talking heads within the community.

About

Behind the Navy Campaign is a not for profit company called Twenty Thirty Two, set up by Steve Jermy and Bethany Torvell for the sole purpose of running the campaign. As Director, Steve deals with many of the high level contacts in Parliament, the press and those still in service. Beth manages the campaign, overseeing the day to day work of sending briefings to the right people, arranging background briefings where needed and setting up comments and interviews in the press.

The Royal Navy is aware of our activities, but there is no official relationship nor do we seek official endorsement. Rather, our stance is independent so that we can speak out without being subject to fear of reprisal or pressure to follow a certain line because it is deemed political convenient. We aim to raise awareness of general concerns about the outcome of the SDSR for the Navy but also, more importantly, for Britain’s long term security.

Because the decision to retire the Harrier, arguably the most significant cut to come out of the SDSR, impacted on the Fleet Air Arm, the Navy Campaign approached the Fleet Air Arm Officers’ Association for funding. This was very kindly been provided by the FAAOA and other organisations, and the money has gone towards paying Beth’s wages and the costs associated with start up. Beth has reported back to the Committee on the progress of the Campaign and recently spoke at the FAAOA AGM.

Aims

The aims of the Navy Campaign are threefold:

• Communication – relaying information between Parliament, the Press and the Public, so that the case presented is balanced.

• Aviation/Amphibiosity – campaigning to retain these two key capabilities, as they maintain and facilitate political choice.

• Personnel and People – campaigning to guarantee the retention of individuals and skills within the Navy, as well as bolstering morale and re-invigorating the Naval Community.

The first and last points are relatively straightforward. Over the past few months it has become clear that while many people want information, it is not always readily available. We aim to help improve that situation, although it is an uphill battle! With regards to personnel, we are working hard to explain that it is not as simple as putting someone in a uniform and giving them the tools – many of the roles are very complicated and nuanced and require a tacit knowledge that cannot be learned from books and in classrooms. We also do our best to boost morale wherever and whenever possible, something that you can certainly get involved in! Central to all of this is the naval and especially the Fleet Air Arm community, which we will return to shortly.

Aviation and amphibiosity are linked in their importance, and relating the two to each other helps to strengthen the case. The Government understand the past successes of our amphibious forces, and it is possible to make the case for a continuation of that capability without encountering too much opposition.

Making the case for maritime aviation is hard – there is a level of ignorance that has to be addressed before we can start to make the case for maritime aviation. Beth has frequently been called by journalists asking fro quotes from the RAF, because many do not understand the difference. This is not new, nor is it isolated to the press and is certainly not their fault – this intellectual malaise has crept in to all corners of life, as certain narratives have dominated the public understanding of aviation.

Stemming from sea blindness, a disease that seems at times to be epidemic in this island nation, this maritime aviation malaise is very dangerous. It was this that enabled the decision to scrap the Harriers back in the autumn, it is this same confounding of logic that the FAA has battle for years. Indeed, it would appear that it may also have influenced those who put the Rt Hon Liam Fox in a position where he said about operations in Libya –

“Why would we be using an aircraft carrier at the present time? Why would we be using fast attack jets? There have been absolutely no calls for either of those assets… There’s a big red herring here … there’s been no need for us to have a carrier there, there’s been no need for us to use fast jets, and we have the ability to use them if required. Of course we have our sovereign base in Cyprus which we can use, and we can use them from the United Kingdom so there’s not actually a problem there.”

What we do

We have been working in three arenas: Parliament, the media, and the naval community. In Parliament, we have been meeting with MPs and building up working relationships. With the media, we have been working to raise the profile of the issues that the Navy Campaign is fighting for. As part of this, Beth has been putting forward commentators for press, radio and TV interviews, as well as arranging background briefings and introductions. Within the community, we have been building up our network and facilitating meetings.

What YOU can do!

Without the support of those in the naval community, our work would be infinitely harder. This work is ongoing, and is an area where you can definitely get involved. There are several ways for you to do this:

Spread the word – tell your friends and family about the campaign. Host a dinner party, an afternoon tea or a session in the pub. Get your local community discussing the issues – as a taxpayer, you are footing the bill, and as someone that lives in this country, these decisions will impact on you! There is more information about us and our website at the end.

Get democratic – get in touch with your elected representatives and ask them to make your views heard. It’s never been easier to contact your MP. You can write to them at:

[Name of MP]
House of Commons
London
SW1A 0AA

You can send them an email through the fantastic service offered by Write to Them (www.writetothem.co.uk). Many MPs list their phone and fax number on their website – why not call them up and arrange a meeting during their surgery hours to discuss the importance of maintain the Fleet Air Arm?

Get vocal – get in touch with the Press. Write to the national papers and your local papers. If you see some incorrect reporting, let the editor know! Many TV and radio programmes are interactive these days, allowing their audience to call, text or email in – why not get involved with that? When dealing with the media, it’s best to keep things short and sweet. Work out what your main argument is, dress it up in a snappy sound bite, and then fire away!

Sign up to the Action List –we have set up a mailing list that we call our Action List, which we use to alert supporters when a specific issue needs their support. (For information on how this has worked previously, please see the article on the Commando Helicopter Force). You can sign up online through our website, or by emailing ‘signmeup@thenavycampaign.com’.

Support us

The Navy Campaign has been supported to date by very kind donations. The FAAOA has provided funding until June, which is fantastic. However, looking at the progress we have made to date in raising the profile of the Navy and the threats it faces, we believe this campaign will need to run beyond June. As such, we are looking to raise funds through contributions from individuals and organisations.

If you or anyone you know would like to make a donation, we will be very grateful. You can donate using a debit or credit card through our website (address at the end) or send a cheque made payable to Twenty Thirty Two to our registered address – 3 Holm Oak Apartments, Melvill Road, Falmouth, England, TR11 4AX.

Details

The Navy Campaign website can be found at: www.thenavycampaign.com

Twenty Thirty Two, Ltd, is the limited company behind the Navy Campaign. It is registered in England and Wales, with the registration No: 07497546. Its registered office is 3 Holm Oak Apartments, Melvill Road, Falmouth, England, TR11 4AX.

P.S. I just wanted to end this on a personal note. I love this job and have been privileged to witness first hand what an impact a small group of determined people can have. Never doubt the importance YOUR involvement can have – one voice alone might get drowned out, but many voices together cannot be ignored. It is a hard fight, but we are making progress. I’m also learning the unspoken Fleet Air Arm ethos – never give up, never give in, and never fear that you’re alone. We’re all in this together, and we’re all going to win this together.

- Beth

Who We Are

Steve, known to many as Commodore Jermy, served as a naval officer in a varied military career which encompassed a range of naval aviation, sea command and high level staff appointments. His commands included HM Ship’s Tiger Bay, Upton, Arrow, Cardiff, the 5th Destroyer Squadron and the Fleet Air Arm. His senior staff appointments were in the MoD Directorate of Policy Planning, as Principal Staff Officer to the Chief of Defence Staff, and working with the RAF at the Air HQ in High Wycombe. He saw active service flying from HMS Invincible in the Falklands War, and his last operational service was as Strategy Director in the British Embassy in Kabul in Afghanistan 2007-8.

He gained an MPhil in International Relations from Pembroke College Cambridge in 1992, and graduated from the Royal College of Defence Studies in 2008. He now writes, lectures, and consults on strategy and strategic leadership. His book on effective strategy making – ‘Strategy for Action’ – was released in February of this year to critical acclaim.

Beth is very proud to come from a Naval family and has worked in and around Westminster for the past couple of years. She studied Politics at Goldsmiths College and International Security at King’s College, London. Since graduating, she has worked on population engagement and transparency in development for a not for profit organisation, taught a class on conflict and intervention at Goldsmiths, and worked for an MP. She has yet to command a ship larger than a two person Laser.

The Navy Campaign and the Commando Helicopter Force

Having explained what we do, we thought it might be wise to give you a case study to show its impact. There isn’t necessarily a happy ending to this story, but we’ll be working hard to make that as likely as possible.

Back in the autumn, we heard rumblings that the Commando Helicopter Force was in a perilous position. It was believed then, and is still believed now, that there are elements out there who would rather there be one nation and one air force. With the fast jet element of the Fleet Air Arm removed for the next few years, these elements believed the time was ripe to pick off the rest. We made sure to mention the future of the CHF in conversations with the press and with MPs.

On the 15 December last year, Edward Leigh MP asked the Prime Minister if he would “guarantee that the promised transfer of 20 Merlin helicopters from the RAF to the Fleet Air Arm will indeed take place?” The PM assured Mr Leigh that he would look into it, which he did. Just before Christmas, the PM responded in a letter that stated:

I can confirm that it remains our intention to transfer 25 Merlin Mk 3/3a helicopters from the RAF to the Navy over the next few years. They will replace the Sea King Mk 4 helicopters which presently form part of the Royal Navy’s Commando Helicopter Force. They will be based at RNAS Yeovilton.

 

It is planned that these helicopters will be replaced in their present role with the Royal Air Force by new Chinook helicopters.

Very promising! And then the rumours started again – senior figures in the RAF were briefing their people that the transfer wouldn’t go ahead, the Chinook buy was cancelled meaning the RAF pilots wouldn’t be able to transfer, and on and on.

Against this backdrop of promises, intrigue and dirty dealings, the Navy Campaign decided to send an Action Email out, to alert the naval community to what was at hand. It wasn’t an ideal situation – we didn’t have hard proof that there was anything amiss, but even after the alleged meeting that took place in which the Tornados usurped the Harriers, we don’t have hard proof of that betrayal.

Many of you will hopefully have seen the Action Email. It was very simple and set out the case as we knew it, explaining that there wasn’t hard evidence but that the need to act outweighed the need to for a watertight case. We called on the recipient to write to their MP, “explaining the need for the Merlin transfer from the RAF to the FAA to go ahead – the CHF must have the equipment it needs to do its essential job, supporting our troops on the ground. Ask him or her to represent your views to the PM and relevant Ministers.” It also asked individuals to write to Liam Fox, Secretary of State for Defence, and Peter Luff, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State and Minister for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology, making the same case.

The Action Email went out far and wide – through Jungly and Marine networks, throughout the Fleet Air Arm and wider naval community, and beyond. The response was fantastic, with the message being urged on at every point. We’d like to take this moment to thank all of you who were involved in this effort, as it meant a lot to us and, we believe, to the Junglies.

Several journalists were in touch, hoping to find a story. However, we at the Navy Campaign believe very strongly that there is a time and a place for certain discussions. While we wanted to spread the word and attract as much attention as possible, we feel that it is wrong for these men and women who are working so exceptionally hard to read half-truths and speculation about their future jobs in the press. When we were unable to deliver a story with a hook, we failed to get the column inches in the nationals. That said, we made some good contacts that we have worked with on subsequent stories.

We are still pursuing the Jungly case, and mention it at every opportunity. When we talk to the press we make sure it’s mentioned, and when we pass briefing packs to politicians, the CHF feature among the papers. Additionally, when we interact with the Naval Staff, we frequently ask if they will mention the Junglies more. The continuing role of Commando Helicopter Force featured prominently in briefings to the press on RN redundancies and increased efforts are being made to engage politicians with the rotary wing side of the Fleet Air Arm.

Looking to the future, we will be working hard to hold the PM to his promise. In response to a recent question, Peter Luff, the Minister for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology stated:

As part of the Future Force 2020, the Strategic Defence and Security Review endorsed the Commando Helicopter Force as a key component of Littoral Manoeuvre Tailored Air Group and confirmed its requirement. In addition to Littoral Manoeuvre, the force supports Maritime Counter Terrorism and Land Operations.

To ensure the longer term viability of the Commando Helicopter Force, it is intended to transfer the Royal Air Force Merlin helicopters Mk3/3a to the Royal Navy and to undertake a ship optimisation program to MK4/4a in order to provide embarked medium lift capability for Littoral Manoeuvre. The Commando Helicopter Force will also receive a small number of Battlefield Wildcat (Army) helicopters to replace the Lynx Mk7/9a.

Things are looking up for the Commando Helicopter Force, but we cannot rest on our laurels. They key lesson to take away from this episode is that in these tough economic times the Government needs to make cuts, and those cuts will fall on the capabilities that are least understood and protected. We know the case for naval aviation, but the nation doesn’t – our work is far from over!